United States of America v. Raul Guadalupe Monjardin- Iribe

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RAUL GUADALUPE MONJARDIN-
IRIBE,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-10419
D.C. No. 5:15-cr-00375-EJD-3
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2019**
Before: TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Raul Guadalupe Monjardin-Iribe appeals from the district court’s judgment
and challenges the 175-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea
conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute
cocaine and methamphetamine, and distribution and possession with intent to
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) and
846. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Monjardin-Iribe contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable in
light of his mitigating circumstances, including the short time he was involved in
the conspiracy and his lack of criminal history. The district court did not abuse its
discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The within-
Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the large
quantity of drugs Monjardin-Iribe possessed, the substantial role he played in the
offense, and his attempt to obstruct the investigation. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Contrary to Monjardin-Iribe’s contention, the court did not “mechanically” apply
the Guidelines in fashioning his sentence, but rather engaged in the type of
individualized assessment of the sentencing factors required under section 3553(a).
See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 994 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Moreover, the court sufficiently addressed Monjardin-Iribe’s sentencing disparity
argument, did not rely on any clearly erroneous facts in imposing the sentence, and
adequately explained the sentence. See id. at 992-93.
We decline to consider issues raised for the first time in Monjardin-Iribe’s
reply brief. See United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005).
AFFIRMED.

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