Rohini Kumar, an individual, on behalf of herself, the general public v. Salov North America Corp.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROHINI KUMAR, an individual, on behalf
of herself, the general public and those
similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SALOV NORTH AMERICA CORP.,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
THEODORE H. FRANK,
Objector-Appellant.
No. 17-16405
D.C. No. 4:14-cv-02411-YGR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 28, 2018
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, W. FLETCHER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
This dispute arises from the district court’s approval of a nationwide class
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
SEP 11 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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action settlement between a class of purchasers of Filippo Berio olive oil and the
manufacturer of the olive oil, Salov North America Corp. On appeal, Theodore
Frank, a non-participating class member and objector, challenges the approval of
the settlement agreement. Salov North America Corp. contends that Frank has no
standing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Assuming that Frank ultimately paid a higher price for the olive oil than he
would have without “Imported from Italy” on the label, he has Article III standing
to challenge the settlement agreement. See Knisley v. Network Assocs., Inc., 312
F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002). Because we assume without deciding that Frank
also has statutory standing, we move to the merits of his challenge.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement
agreement. See In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 940 (9th
Cir. 2011) (“We review a district court’s approval of a class action settlement for
clear abuse of discretion.”). The court properly considered and applied the
relevant Hanlon factors in its determination that the settlement was fair,
reasonable, and adequate. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th
Cir. 1998) (providing factors to be balanced by a district court when assessing
whether a settlement agreement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e), including: “the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class

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action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of
discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of
counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class
members to the proposed settlement”).
The district court considered the strength of the plaintiffs’ case and the risk
involved with further litigation, noting that Salov North America Corp. had a
legitimate defense and that this “was [not] the strongest case [she] ha[d] ever
seen.” The district court also noted that proceeding to trial would be costly given
the need for expert testimony, and that the best potential outcome at trial would not
exceed the recovery per bottle offered by the settlement. Further, the court
recognized that the litigation was “hard fought” and that class counsel reached an
“excellent result” for the class, including achieving the class’s non-monetary goal
of “get[ting] the defendants to improve their practices.” Because there is no
“strong showing that the district court’s decision was a clear abuse of discretion,”
we affirm. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027 (“The district court’s final determination
to approve the settlement should be reversed only upon a strong showing that the
district court’s decision was a clear abuse of discretion.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
AFFIRMED.

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