KHALIFAH E.D. SAIF’ULLAH, AKA Fernando A. Jackson, Sr. v. Jimmy Cruzen;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KHALIFAH E.D. SAIF’ULLAH, AKA
Fernando A. Jackson, Sr.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JIMMY CRUZEN; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-17336
D.C. No. 5:15-cv-01739-LHK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2018**
Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Khalifah E.D. Saif’ullah, AKA Fernando A. Jackson, Sr., a California state
prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal claims related to the interruption of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
AUG 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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congregational prayer. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo. Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Saif’ullah’s Free
Exercise Clause claim because Saif’ullah failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material facts as to whether defendants’ conduct constituted a substantial burden.
See id. at 1031-32 (“A person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the
government action in question substantially burdens the person’s practice of her
religion.”); see also Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 1998) (no
substantial interference where intrusions on plaintiff-prisoner’s prayers were
“relatively short-term and sporadic” and did not constitute a substantial
interference).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Saif’ullah’s
Establishment Clause claim because Saif’ullah failed to raise a triable dispute as to
whether defendants’ actions constituted government sponsorship of religion. See
Canell, 143 F.3d at 1214 (where there was no indication that other prison staff
were aware of or condoned defendant’s conduct, it was not “sufficiently imbued
with the state’s authority” to constitute government sponsorship of religion).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Saif’ullah’s

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retaliation claim because Saif’ullah failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether
defendants interrupted the congregational prayer because of Saif’ullah’s protected
conduct. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To prevail
on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was the
substantial or motivating factor behind the defendant’s conduct.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Saif’ullah’s equal
protection claim because Saif’ullah failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether
defendants had discriminatory intent. See Mendiola–Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d
1239, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose
is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” (citation, internal
quotation marks, and brackets omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Saif’ullah’s
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim because monetary
damages are not available, see Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031, and Saif’ullah’s claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief are moot, see Blair v. Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514,
1519 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[I]n the context of . . . declaratory or injunctive relief, past
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy . . .

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if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” (citation, internal
quotation marks, and brackets omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Saif’ullah’s request for judicial notice, set forth in his reply brief, is denied.
Defendants’ opposed motion to strike portions of Saif’ullah’s reply brief
(Docket Entry No. 14) is granted.
AFFIRMED.

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