Jack R. Finnegan v. A. Patrick Munoz;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JACK R. FINNEGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
A. PATRICK MUNOZ; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-56081
D.C. No. 8:15-cv-00420-DSF-RNB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2017**
Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jack R. Finnegan appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from
state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 6 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 15-56081
1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Finnegan’s action as barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Finnegan’s action is a “de facto appeal” of a
prior state court judgment, and he raises claims that are “inextricably intertwined”
with that judgment. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012)
(concluding plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy was “inextricably intertwined” with
the state court’s decision); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th
Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff's claim because the relief
sought “would require the district court to determine the state court’s decision was
wrong and thus void”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend the
complaint because amendment would have been futile. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp.
of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would
be futile).
We reject as unsupported by the record Finnegan’s contention that the
district court was biased against him.
Finnegan’s motions for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
(Docket Entry Nos. 21 and 22) are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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