In re: JUN HO YANG; HO SOON HWANG YANG v. Fund Management International, LLC

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: JUN HO YANG; HO SOON
HWANG YANG,
Debtors,
------------------------------
JUN HO YANG; HO SOON HWANG
YANG,
Appellants,
v.
FUND MANAGEMENT
INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
Appellee.
No. 16-60016
BAP No. 15-1057
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Taylor, Faris, and Corbit, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 28, 2017
Pasadena, California
FILED
OCT 03 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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Before: W. FLETCHER and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and FREUDENTHAL,**
Chief District Judge.
Jun Ho Yang and his wife Ho Soon Hwang Yang (collectively, the Yangs)
appeal the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirming the
bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment to Fund Management International,
LLC on its claim that the debt owed by the Yangs is excepted from discharge
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(1).
Although the facts to which a party has stipulated remain binding on that
party throughout the various phases of the same case, see Christian Legal Soc’y
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661,
676–77 (2010), neither the BAP nor the parties have pointed us to any legal
principle (and we are aware of none) providing any basis other than collateral
estoppel for holding that facts stipulated by a party in one case could bind that
party in a different case. Cf. Hayhoe v. Cole (In re Cole), 226 B.R. 647, 655
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998).
Under California law, stipulated facts in one case may be given preclusive
effect in a different case only “when the parties manifest an intent to be collaterally
** The Honorable Nancy Freudenthal, Chief United States District Judge
for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
2

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bound by its terms.” Cal. State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court, 50
Cal. 3d 658, 664 (1990). Here, Jun Ho Yang submitted a declaration that he did
not intend the stipulated facts in the Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for
Entry of Judgment in the prior state court action to have a preclusive effect in
future proceedings. Such a declaration (even if self-serving) creates a genuine
issue of material fact as to the parties’ intent. See Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
784 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, the BAP erred in holding that the
facts to which the Yangs stipulated were binding on them in their subsequent
bankruptcy proceeding as a matter of law.1 The parties shall bear their own costs
on appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
1Because we decide on this basis, we do not address whether the Yangs’
stipulations amount to a prepetition waiver of dischargeability or whether the
stipulated facts prove that the actions of either or both of the Yangs amounted to
fraud for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A).
3

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