Lisa Ann Colmery-Pinkerton v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LISA ANN COLMERY-PINKERTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 15-55810
D.C. No.
5:14-cv-00726-JFW-PLA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 6, 2017**
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Lisa Colmery-Pinkerton appeals pro se the district court’s judgment
affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Colmery-Pinkerton’s
application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income
FILED
APR 10 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. We review de novo, Ghanim v.
Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014), and we affirm.
Colmery-Pinkerton contends that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred
in not adopting the recommendation of “the SSA representative” that Colmery-
Pinkerton is unable to work. We construe Colmery-Pinkerton’s pro se pleadings
liberally. See Garmon v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2016).
Colmery-Pinkerton’s briefing indicates she intends the term “the SSA
representative” to refer to the attorney who represented her at her hearing before
the ALJ, and also perhaps to the vocational expert (“VE”) who testified at her
hearing.
The ALJ did not err in disregarding the opening statement made by
Colmery-Pinkerton’s counsel during the hearing before the ALJ, arguing that
Colmery-Pinkerton was entitled to a disability finding. Although a claimant’s
counsel may introduce arguments in support of her case, such argument by counsel
is not sworn witness testimony that the ALJ must weigh in determining whether
the claimant is disabled. See 42 C.F.R.§§ 405.1030(b); 405.1036(c); 405.1036(d).
The determination of a claimant’s ability to work is reserved to the ALJ. See
McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Colmery-Pinkerton asserts that the ALJ disregarded the VE’s testimony that
she was unable to work. To the contrary, the ALJ properly posed a series of
hypothetical questions to the VE regarding the limitations the ALJ found to be
supported by the record evidence and incorporated into the residual functional
capacity assessment. See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir 2001)
(“An ALJ must propose a hypothetical that is based on medical assumptions
supported by substantial evidence in the record that reflects each of the claimant’s
limitations.”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The ALJ did not err in
relying on the VE’s response to a hypothetical that incorporated all of Colmery-
Pinkerton’s limitations that were supported by substantial evidence. Osenbrock,
240 F.3d at 1164.
AFFIRMED.
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