MARLON BLACHER, AKA Marlon Jessie Blacher v. MS. ANTONE, D Facility Librarian

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARLON BLACHER, AKA Marlon Jessie
Blacher,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MS. ANTONE, D Facility Librarian,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 15-56761
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00403-GW-AGR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 14, 2017**
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Marlon Blacher, aka Marlon Jessie Blacher, a California state prisoner,
appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging denial of access to
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 23 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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the courts. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Blacher
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he exhausted his
administrative remedies before filing his lawsuit or whether administrative
remedies were “effectively unavailable.” See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90
(2006) (the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires “proper exhaustion,”
which means “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so
that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)” (emphasis, citation, and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 826 (9th Cir.
2010) (PLRA does not require exhaustion when remedies are “effectively
unavailable”).
We reject as meritless Blacher’s contention that the district court failed to
use Blacher’s correct legal name.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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