Karyl Jean Krug v. Maricopa County Superior Court, a Subdivision of the State of Arizona;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KARYL JEAN KRUG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARICOPA COUNTY SUPERIOR
COURT, a Subdivision of the State of
Arizona; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-15012
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01320-JWS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John W. Sedwick, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2016**
Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Karyl Jean Krug appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging First Amendment retaliation claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s
FILED
JAN 3 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Knievel v. ESPN, 393
F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
The district court properly dismissed Krug’s claims against Maricopa
County Superior Court because in this case it is an “arm of the state,” not subject to
§ 1983 liability. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989)
(holding that “‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are not liable
under § 1983); Arizona v. Super. Ct., 420 P.2d 945, 951 (Ariz. App. 1966) (“There
is only one superior court in the State of Arizona.” (citing Ariz. Const. art. 6,
§ 13)), vacated on other grounds, 430 P.2d 408 (Ariz. 1967).
However, the district court abused its discretion in denying Krug’s request to
amend her claims to add Maricopa County as a defendant because it is not clear
amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656
F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining
that a court may deny leave to amend where proposed amendments would be
futile). See also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694,
98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037–38, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); Clairmont v. Sound Mental
Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011) (“in evaluating whether a plaintiff
should be considered a public employee [entitled to bring a First Amendment
retaliation claim], we consider whether the relationship is analogous to that
2

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between an employer and employee”); 1 Barbara T. Lindemann, Paul Grossman &
C. Geoffrey Weirich, Employment Discrimination Law Ch. 22.I.A.2.c (5th ed.
2012) (exploring “The ‘Joint Employer’ Theory” of employment law).
The district court properly dismissed Krug’s retaliatory termination claim
against defendant Alessi and her blackballing claim because Krug failed to allege
facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).
However, dismissal of Krug’s retaliatory termination claim against
defendants Westover, Reyes, and Ash was error because taking the facts in the
light most favorable to Krug, her allegations that these defendants collectively
terminated her shortly after she engaged in protected activity were sufficient to
state a claim. See Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070–72 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth the elements for a First Amendment retaliation claim); see also Watison v.
Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because direct evidence of
retaliatory intent rarely can be pleaded in a complaint, allegation of a chronology
of events from which retaliation can be inferred is sufficient to survive
dismissal.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Krug’s request for
recusal because Krug failed to establish any ground for recusal. See United States
15-15012 3

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v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review
and grounds for recusal).
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
15-15012 4

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