Thomas M. Hurst, an individual v. Falcon Air Express Incorporated, a Florida Corporation

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS M. HURST, an individual,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
FALCON AIR EXPRESS
INCORPORATED, a Florida Corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 14-16108
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00256-SRB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 12, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: NOONAN, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Thomas Hurst (“Hurst”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellee Falcon Air Enterprises, Inc. (“Falcon”) on all of
Hurst’s claims. We affirm.
FILED
MAY 25 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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1. The district court did not err in granting judgment in favor of Falcon on
Hurst’s claim of disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112. Hurst failed to raise a triable issue of fact that he is
disabled due to his heart conditions or the side effects from his medications. Thus,
he did not make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination. See Nunes v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999).
2. Nor did the district court err in granting judgment in favor of Falcon on
Hurst’s claim of religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. As the district court noted, Falcon fully accommodated
Hurst’s request not to work on Sundays. Hurst did not work a Sunday from the
time he notified management of his religious beliefs until his termination.
3. Finally, the district court correctly rejected Hurst’s retaliation claim.
Although Hurst was terminated only weeks after he filed his discrimination charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, there is no evidence that the
managers responsible for firing Hurst were aware of his protected activity at the
time they made their decision. Therefore, Hurst failed to raise a triable issue of
fact as to whether his termination was retaliatory. See Cohen v. Fred Meyer, 686
F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1982).
AFFIRMED.
2

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