Brandon Eugene Bales v. Clarence W. Dupnik; Attorney General of the State of Arizona; Charles L. Ryan

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRANDON EUGENE BALES,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
CLARENCE W. DUPNIK; ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
ARIZONA; CHARLES L. RYAN,
Respondents - Appellees.
No. 14-16067
D.C. No. 4:12-cv-00483-BPV
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Bernardo P. Velasco, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 10, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: SILVERMAN, FISHER, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Brandon Eugene Bales appeals the denial of federal habeas relief after he
challenged his Arizona state conviction for driving under the influence. The
FILED
FEB 12 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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district court held that Bales’s habeas appeal was barred by Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Bales contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when his
blood was drawn pursuant to Arizona’s “implied consent” statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 28–1321 (2015). However, Stone v. Powell directs that “where the State
has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the
ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was
introduced at his trial.” Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 (footnote call number omitted).1
Bales appears to argue that he did not receive a “full and fair” trial because the
state court misconstrued the facts and misapplied clearly established federal law.
But these arguments, like all of the arguments in Bales’s opening brief, go to
whether his Fourth Amendment claim was wrongly decided, not whether the
hearing itself was fair. See id. at 482. In this case, Bales had a full evidentiary
hearing on his suppression motion, as well as an appeal to the superior court and an
opportunity for further appellate review. Thus, the district court properly ruled that
Bales had the opportunity for a full and fair hearing on his Fourth Amendment
1 We recently confirmed that Stone survived enactment of the Antiterrorism
& Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Newman v. Wengler, 790 F.3d 876,
879–81 (9th Cir. 2015).

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claim.
Finally, in his reply Bales argues for a new exception to the Stone doctrine
that would allow habeas review of Fourth Amendment issues that affect a large
number of people or claims. He provides no persuasive reason to support this
alleged exception, however, and we decline to create such a rule. Stone is clear:
We cannot reconsider the merits of Bales’s Fourth Amendment claim, so federal
habeas relief is unavailable.
AFFIRMED.

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