David Morales-Acosta v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID MORALES-ACOSTA,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 13-70509
Agency No. A013-719-333
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 9, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: McKEOWN and IKUTA, Circuit Judges and PRATT,*** Senior District
Judge.
Morales-Acosta appeals a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) to deny Morales-Acosta relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
FILED
FEB 11 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

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He also appeals the BIA’s decision that he was ineligible for asylum and
withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
The BIA’s decision that Morales-Acosta was ineligible for relief under CAT
was supported by substantial evidence. The record did not establish that it was
more likely than not that Morales-Acosta would be tortured in Mexico “by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); see Ornelas-
Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Vitug v. Holder,
723 F.3d 1056, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013).
The BIA did not err in holding that Morales-Acosta was convicted of a
“particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) and was therefore
ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The agency applied the correct
legal standard in determining that Morales-Acosta’s conviction did not qualify as
an exception to the presumption that drug trafficking felonies are particularly
serious crimes under the factors set forth in Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270
(A.G. 2002). If the agency has considered the appropriate factors, “we cannot
reweigh evidence” as to whether the conviction meets the “particularly serious
crime” standard. Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 2013)).
2

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PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.
3

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