Andrew R. Lake v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security Administration

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANDREW R. LAKE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 14-35503
D.C. No. 4:13-cv-00077-BMM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 1, 2016**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, D. W. NELSON and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Andrew Lake appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social
FILED
FEB 03 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), and we affirm.
Lake contends that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in
determining that Lake’s carpal tunnel syndrome is not a severe impairment. The
record documented a single doctor visit that reflected a “suspect[ed]” diagnosis of
“possible tunnel neuropathy” based solely on Lake’s reported symptoms, and no
further testing or other follow up. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision that Lake’s carpal tunnel syndrome was not a severe impairment. Ukolov
v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2005); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,
1290 (9th Cir. 1996).
Lake contends that the ALJ erred in discrediting his symptom testimony.
The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for the credibility
assessment, including inconsistencies between Lake’s testimony regarding his
limitations and the medical opinions and documentary evidence. See Molina, 674
F.3d at 1112-13 (ALJ can reject claimant testimony about severity of symptoms by
offering specific, clear, and convincing reasons); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 636
(9th Cir. 2007).
Lake challenges the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment
and resulting finding that Lake is not disabled. The ALJ posed an alternative light
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RFC assessment to the vocational expert (“VE”) that included all of Lake’s
credible limitations. The ALJ provided a reasonable and sufficient rationale and
properly relied on the VE’s expert testimony that Lake could perform his past work
as a cashier, housekeeper, and bartender, as well as the jobs of office helper and
rental clerk, all of which exist in significant numbers in the national economy. See
Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that this court
will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than
one rational interpretation); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir.
2005).
AFFIRMED.
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