HAROLD L. ARMSTRONG, Sr. v. R. BARNES, Warden, High Desert State Prison;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HAROLD L. ARMSTRONG, Sr.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
R. BARNES, Warden, High Desert State
Prison; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 13-16806
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-02037-LKK-
CKD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence K. Karlton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 20, 2016**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Harold L. Armstrong, Sr., appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) alleging deliberate indifference to
FILED
JAN 27 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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his serious medical needs and disability discrimination. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447
(9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Armstrong’s Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim because Armstrong failed to allege facts sufficient to
show that any defendant disregarded an excessive risk to Armstrong’s health. See
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2004) (a prison official is
deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to an inmate’s health; neither a prisoner’s difference of opinion concerning the
course of treatment nor mere negligence in treating a medical condition amounts to
deliberate indifference).
The district court properly dismissed Armstrong’s claim that prison officials
violated the ADA because Armstrong failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
prison officials discriminated against him because of a disability. See Simmons v.
Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The ADA prohibits
discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Armstrong’s
requests for appointment of counsel because Armstrong failed to demonstrate
exceptional circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir.
13-16806 2

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2009) (setting forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances”
requirement).
AFFIRMED.
13-16806 3

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