Daniel Jose Delgado Paredes v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL JOSE DELGADO PAREDES,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 13-73102
Agency No. A098-458-375
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 18, 2015**
Before: TASHIMA, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Daniel Jose Delgado Paredes, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for
cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8
FILED
NOV 24 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law and constitutional claims.
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part
and dismiss in part the petition for review.
Contrary to Delgado-Paredes’ contention, the BIA did not hold him to an
impermissibly high burden of proof by reviewing the IJ’s factual findings for clear
error. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (“Facts determined by the immigration judge,
including findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed only to
determine whether the findings of the immigration judge are clearly erroneous.”).
Nor did the BIA err in relying on Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., which
concerns the clearly erroneous standard of review. 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)
(“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice
between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”).
Contrary to Delgado-Paredes’ contention, the agency applied the correct
legal standard in determining that he had not established the requisite periods of
good moral character to qualify for cancellation of removal or voluntary departure
by considering all relevant factors. See Torres-Guzman v. INS, 804 F.2d 531, 534
(9th Cir. 1986) (“Where, as here, petitioners have not committed acts bringing
them within section 1101(f)’s enumerated categories, the [BIA] must consider all
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of petitioners’ evidence on factors relevant to the determination of good moral
character.”).
The record does not support Delgado-Paredes’ contention that the BIA failed
to provide sufficient reasoning and detail in its opinion. See Najmabadi v. Holder,
597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010). Nor does the record support Delgado-Paredes’
contention that the BIA mischaracterized his criminal record.
Because the BIA committed no error in determining that Delgado-Paredes
lacked the requisite good moral character, it follows that the BIA did not violate
due process. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (to prevail on a
due process challenge, an alien must show error and prejudice).
We lack jurisdiction to review Delgado-Paredes’ remaining challenges to the
agency’s discretionary good moral character determination because they do not
constitute colorable constitutional claims or questions of law that would invoke our
jurisdiction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Bazua-Cota v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 747,
748-49 (9th Cir. 2006) (while “[t]his court retains jurisdiction over petitions for
review that raise colorable constitutional claims or questions of law,” a petitioner
may not attack a discretionary decision simply by phrasing his arguments as a legal
challenge to invoke our jurisdiction).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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