Sarah M. Blair v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SARAH M. BLAIR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 13-35717
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01118-BAT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 4, 2015
Seattle, Washington
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, EBEL ** , and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Sarah Blair appeals from the district court’s order reducing her attorneys’
fees and costs award under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Blair claims
that the district court erred by (1) making multiple substantial justification
FILED
JUL 27 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable David M. Ebel, Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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determinations, (2) concluding that her claims were unrelated, (3) finding that she
did not obtain an excellent result, and (4) failing to explain its fees award
sufficiently.
I
In order to recover attorneys’ fees under the EAJA, a plaintiff must establish
her eligibility by demonstrating, inter alia, that the government was not
“substantially justified” in the positions it took on the merits litigation. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A). “[T]he ‘substantial justification’ requirement is a single finding
that operates as a threshold for determining EAJA eligibility.” Atkins v. Apfel, 154
F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). Because “[a] district court abuses
its discretion when it fails to apply the correct legal rule,” Meier v. Colvin, 727
F.3d 867, 869–70 (9th Cir. 2013), the district court abused its discretion in making
separate substantial justification determinations for each of the issues Blair raised
on appeal.
The district court also misapplied step one of the Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424 (1983), reasonableness analysis. “[O]nce a private litigant has met the
multiple conditions for eligibility for EAJA fees, the district court’s task of
determining what fee is reasonable is essentially the same as that described in
Hensley.” Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161 (1990). First, the district court
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must determine if the “plaintiff fail[ed] to prevail on claims that were unrelated to
the claims on which he succeeded[.]” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. In our circuit,
“[c]laims are unrelated if the successful and unsuccessful claims are ‘distinctly
different’ both legally and factually.” Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 813 (9th Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 (“It
may well be that cases involving [ ] unrelated claims are unlikely to arise with
great frequency.”). Blair’s claims were factually related because the district court
was tasked with reviewing a unitary administrative record for deficiencies. The
claims were also legally related, since all of the district court’s evidentiary
assessments related to the single legal determination of whether Blair was disabled
for purposes of her Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance
Benefits applications. The district court thus abused its discretion in concluding
that the claims were unrelated. See Meier, 727 F.3d at 869–70.
Despite the district court’s errors at the substantial justification and
Hensley step one inquiries, we may affirm if such errors “[did] not affect [Blair’s]
substantial rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. After assessing the relatedness of a
plaintiff’s claims, “the court must apply the second part of the analysis, in which
the court evaluates the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in
relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Dang, 422 F.3d at
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813 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he most critical factor is the degree of
success obtained,” and the “district court should make clear that it has considered
the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37. The district court explained in detail its conclusion
that Blair did not achieve an excellent result warranting a fully compensatory fees
award. The court noted that Blair did not receive an award of benefits, as
requested, and that the “Court’s Order limited the scope of remand” to reassessing
several consultants’ positions regarding Blair’s “ability to persist and handle
workplace stress.” Thus, with respect to the second step of the Hensley
reasonableness inquiry, the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing
Blair’s fees based on her limited success. See Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d
644, 649–50 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The bulk of discretion retained by the district court
lies in the second, significance of relief, inquiry,” and district courts have
“discretion to determine whether [the outcome] supports [p]laintiff’s fee request.”).
In light of the court’s adequate degree-of-success analysis, the district
court’s substantial justification and claim relatedness errors “[did] not affect
[Blair’s] substantial rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. The parties do not dispute that
Blair was eligible for EAJA fees. Therefore, the district court’s multiple
substantial justification determinations did not prejudice the court’s conclusion that
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Blair was eligible for fees. Further, because Hensley’s degree-of-success and
unrelated-claims inquiries provide independent grounds for reducing fees awards,
see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, the district court’s erroneous application of Hensley’s
first step was harmless.
As to the district court’s explanation for its fees award, the court’s implicit
acceptance of the undisputed $184.32 hourly rate and its degree-of-success
explanation for reducing Blair’s award to approximately 75 percent of the
requested amount was sufficiently specific “to permit an appellate court to
determine whether the district court abused its discretion in the way the analysis
was undertaken.” McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir.
2009). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision reducing Blair’s fees
award for the merits litigation.
II
With respect to her fees-on-fees request, the district court reduced Blair’s
award from $737.28 to $220.00, asserting only that such an award was “roughly
commensurate with the degree of success obtained Ms. Blair achieved [sic] in her
initial EAJA fee motion.” However, this 70 percent reduction is not “roughly
commensurate” to the court’s 25 percent reduction of Blair’s fees award for the
merits litigation, and the district court did not otherwise explain its analysis of
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Blair’s success on the EAJA motion. Thus, the district court abused its discretion
in reducing Blair’s fees-on-fees award, and “we have no choice but to remand the
case to the district court to permit it to make the necessary calculations and provide
the necessary explanations.” McCown, 565 F.3d at 1102.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.1
1 Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
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