Alfonso Mouzon v. PAM AHLIN, Ex-Executive Director of Coalinga State Hospital;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALFONSO MOUZON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PAM AHLIN, Ex-Executive Director of
Coalinga State Hospital; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 14-16261
D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00143-GSA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Gary S. Austin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted April 7, 2015***
Before: FISHER, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
California civil detainee Alfonso Mouzon appeals pro se from the district
FILED
APR 15 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** Mouzon consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging his civil confinement
under California’s Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th
Cir. 2005). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Hartmann v.
Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.
The district properly dismissed Mouzon’s claim for prospective injunctive
relief because he failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the SVPA’s post-
commitment procedures deprived him of due process. See Portman v. County of
Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth elements of a § 1983
procedural due process claim); see also Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a) (“A
person who has been committed as a sexually violent predator shall be permitted to
petition the court for conditional release with or without the recommendation or
concurrence of the Director of State Hospitals.”).
Dismissal of Mouzon’s claims for damages and declaratory relief was proper
because a judgment in Mouzon’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his SVPA civil commitment. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)
(§ 1983 claims that necessarily challenge the fact or duration of confinement are
barred unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated); Huftile, 410 F.3d at
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1139-41, 1142 (applying Heck to civilly committed sex offenders and noting that a
dismissal under Heck is without prejudice).
We do not consider Mouzon’s ex post facto argument because it was not
properly raised below. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir.
2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
3 14-16261

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