Sreang Sea v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SREANG SEA,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 10-72139
Agency No. A097-868-066
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 8, 2014**
San Francisco, California
Before: SILVERMAN, W. FLETCHER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Sreang Sea, a native and citizen of Cambodia, petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order denying his application for asylum and
his application for cancellation of removal. We deny the petition for review.
FILED
APR 11 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

-- 1 of 3 --

-2-
The BIA agreed with the Immigration Judge that Sea had abandoned his
asylum application after he failed to meet a filing deadline. The IJ was well within
her discretion to pretermit Sea’s asylum application as having been abandoned
under these circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) (“The Immigration Judge
may set . . . time limits for the filing of applications and related documents and
responses thereto, if any. If an application or document is not filed within the time
set by the Immigration Judge, the opportunity to file that application or document
shall be deemed waived.”).
Second, Sea argues that the IJ took an overly restrictive interpretation of
“extreme cruelty” in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and thus erred in denying his
application for cancellation of removal. The court reviews questions of law and
statutory interpretation in immigration proceedings de novo. Singh v. Holder, 638
F.3d 1196, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 2011). Sea’s evidence that he was subjected to
extreme cruelty (his wife ignoring him, going out with other men, and making
hurtful comments) paints a picture of marital misconduct and “unkindness,” as the
IJ held, but not of the “extreme cruelty” contemplated by the statute for purposes
of cancellation of removal. See Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 840 (9th Cir.
2003) (“extreme cruelty” is not “mere unkindness” and must rather to rise to a
level of an “extreme concept of domestic violence” in which a spouse engaged in

-- 2 of 3 --

-3-
“manipulative tactics aimed at ensuring [his or her] dominance and control”). By
failing to meet the threshold for extreme cruelty, Sea is ineligible for cancellation
of removal. Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005).
The petition for review is DENIED.

-- 3 of 3 --