Orange County Department of Education v. State of California Department of Education

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ORANGE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Respondent - Appellee,
A.S., a minor,
Respondent - Appellant,
And
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT; CHARTER OAK UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT; CALIFORNIA
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARINGS,
Respondents.
No. 12-56016
D.C. No. 8:08-cv-00077-JVS-
MLG
MEMORANDUM*
FILED
DEC 18 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

-- 1 of 4 --

Page 2 of 4
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 5, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: CANBY, WATFORD, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
1. A.S. was a “prevailing party” within the meaning of the Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA). See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). A.S.
succeeded on a “significant issue”—namely, who would pay for his Free
Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). See Parents of Student W v. Puyallup Sch.
Dist., No. 3, 31 F.3d 1489, 1498 (9th Cir. 1994). A.S. did not take a position as to
which agency was responsible for his FAPE, but he did seek to ensure that an
agency would be held responsible. In securing an enforceable judgment holding
the California Department of Education (CDE) responsible, A.S. achieved the
“benefit [he] sought in bringing the suit,” effectuating a “material alteration of the
legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in
the [IDEA].” Id.
2. A.S. is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for the Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH) proceedings. After carefully reviewing the
record, we conclude that A.S. has established the elements of equitable estoppel

-- 2 of 4 --

Page 3 of 4
with respect to the OAH fees request. See Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008).
After the district court entered judgment against CDE, A.S.’s counsel sent
CDE a demand letter seeking attorney’s fees. A.S.’s counsel stated, “I do hope we
can settle this matter without the need for additional litigation and the costs such
would incur,” but noted that if she did not receive a response within 30 days she
would file a complaint in the district court to recover the fees.
Shortly thereafter, CDE informed A.S.’s counsel that it intended to appeal
the district court’s judgment, and asked whether she would be “willing to stipulate
to a stay of execution on the judgment for reimbursement of costs and fees pending
the appeal?” CDE stated that if its appeal proved unsuccessful, “we will negotiate
with all parties that have claims for costs or fees.” A.S. stipulated to a stay of
execution of the judgment.
Based on CDE’s assertions, A.S. justifiably inferred that CDE intended A.S.
to refrain from filing a claim for fees so that the parties could negotiate fees out of
court at a later date, if CDE ultimately lost its appeal. A.S. relied on CDE’s
representations to his detriment. See id. Because these representations occurred
before the statute of limitations ran on A.S.’s claim for OAH fees, CDE is estopped

-- 3 of 4 --

Page 4 of 4
from invoking the statute of limitations against A.S. regarding the OAH fees
request.
3. A.S.’s claim for fees incurred during the district court proceedings fails,
however. A.S. failed to file a motion seeking fees for the district court proceedings
within the mandated fourteen-day period. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B). The
record shows nothing that occurred during that period that would justify A.S.’s
failure to timely file. The communications referenced above occurred after the
fourteen-day deadline had already passed.
4. A.S. does not challenge the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees for
the prior Ninth Circuit proceedings. We affirm the district court’s denial of those
fees.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
No costs.

-- 4 of 4 --