Daniel Macio Saunders v. King County

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL MACIO SAUNDERS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
KING COUNTY,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 12-35834
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-01456-RSM
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 5, 2013
Seattle, Washington
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, PAEZ and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
1. Saunders didn’t have a free-standing federal due process right to be
present when a criminal information was filed and an arrest warrant issued. See,
e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119–22 (1975). Despite this well-settled law,
Saunders appears to argue that the Washington Superior Court Criminal Rules
FILED
NOV 21 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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(“CrRs”) give him a federally enforceable right to be present for these events.
Even if the Rules create enforceable liberty interests beyond what is required by
federal due process, see, e.g., Ky. Dep’t. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
460–63 (1989), Saunders’s claim fails because Washington’s procedures for filing
a criminal information and issuing an arrest warrant were followed in his case.
These events were governed by Rules 2.1 and 2.2, which make no provision for a
defendant’s presence at this stage of a criminal proceeding. Nothing in the plain
language of these rules suggests that they don’t apply to individuals like Saunders
who are in custody when charges are filed against them.
Nor did Rule 3.2.1 give Saunders the right to be present when his
information was filed and arrest warrant issued. Under that rule, Saunders had the
right to a preliminary hearing for a probable cause determination, and to be
released if no charges were filed within 72 hours. CrR 3.2.1(a)–(b), (f). That’s
exactly what he got.
2. Furthermore, Rule 3.2.1 didn’t bar the County from filing charges against
Saunders more than 72 hours after his arrest. Rule 3.2.1 provides that if no charges
are filed within that time frame, “the accused shall be immediately released from
jail or deemed exonerated from all conditions of release.” CrR 3.2.1(f)(2)(ii).

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Contrary to Saunders’s claim, this language did not forever exonerate him from his
prior criminal conduct; it simply required the County to release him and obtain a
valid warrant for his arrest. Since this is what the County did, Saunders’s due
process claim fails.
AFFIRMED.

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