Ernesto Amaya-Mejia v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ERNESTO AMAYA-MEJIA,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 11-71133
Agency No. A038-855-083
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted September 24, 2013**
Before: RAWLINSON, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Ernesto Amaya-Mejia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from
an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for withholding of
removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our
FILED
SEP 30 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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2 11-71133
jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d
1031, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2013); Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 942 n.1
(9th Cir. 2007). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings,
Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006), and we deny the
petition for review.
Amaya-Mejia does not contend he suffered past persecution. He contends
he fears harm from gangs and inadequate medical care in El Salvador. Substantial
evidence supports the agency’s determination that Amaya-Mejia failed to establish
a clear probability of future persecution on account of a protected ground. See
Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2009) (the REAL ID Act
“requires that a protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an asylum
applicant’s persecution”). Accordingly, his withholding of removal claim fails.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Amaya-Mejia’s
CAT claim because he failed to show that it is more likely than not that the
Salvadoran government would consent or acquiesce to his torture by gangs or by
intentionally depriving him of medical care. See Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d
984, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that to constitute torture, the act must be
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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