United States of America v. Saeed Ur Rahman

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SAEED UR RAHMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 12-10605
D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00437-MCE-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 10, 2013**
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and PIERSOL, Senior
District Judge.***
FILED
AUG 30 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

-- 1 of 4 --

This is an expedited appeal from Defendant Saeed Rahman’s convictions for
two counts of filing a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). The charges
were based on Rahman’s failure to report taxable income in 2005 and 2006, from
gains on real estate transactions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm.1
The district court adequately instructed the jury that, to prove that Rahman
acted “willfully,” the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew
federal tax law imposed a duty on him, and he intentionally and voluntarily violated
that duty. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991). We reject Rahman’s
argument that the failure to give a separate good faith instruction constituted plain
error. See United States. v. Hickey, 580 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (argument of
entitlement to separate good faith instruction, in addition to other instruction on
specific intent, is foreclosed by Ninth Circuit precedent).
The district court excluded evidence that FBI agents came to Rahman’s house
in 2007. Rahman, who is from Pakistan and who has been concerned about his
immigration status, argues on appeal that the evidence would have demonstrated that
he knew he was under surveillance and would have been unlikely to knowingly violate
1We also DENY as moot Appellee’s request, submitted on April 24, 2013, to
file confidential documents under seal.
2

-- 2 of 4 --

federal law. Since the FBI visit occurred after Rahman filed the tax returns in issue,
the trial court did not abuse its wide discretion in excluding this testimony. See United
States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1205 (9th Cir. 2004).
After Rahman’s trial counsel moved for an order to exclude evidence
concerning Rahman receiving public assistance, Rahman’s trial counsel stipulated to
the admission of public assistance documents that he conceded were relevant to issues
in the case. Trial counsel also failed to object to a case worker’s testimony concerning
Rahman receiving public assistance, and did not accept the district court’s offer to
give a limiting instruction regarding the public assistance evidence. Rahman now
contends on appeal that the district court erred in admitting the public assistance
evidence. We review for plain error as plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).2
Although the evidence was such as to suggest that Rahman was not entitled to
the public assistance he received, the district court instructed that the jury was to
determine guilt only on the charges set forth in the indictment. Because the public
assistance evidence was relevant to the charged conduct and the jury was properly
2The government urged us to treat this issue as unreviewable under the
invited error doctrine. See United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir.
2012) (“An error is ‘invited’ and unreviewable only if a defendant ‘induced or
caused the error,’ or if he ‘intentionally relinquished or abandoned a known
right.’”) (quoting United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1997) (en
banc)).
3

-- 3 of 4 --

instructed that the defendant was not on trial for any uncharged conduct or offense,
the admission of the public assistance evidence did not constitute plain error.
Rahman also contends that it was plain error to permit evidence that between
June of 2000 and July of 2006, he acquired sole or partial ownership of twelve
properties that were not directly related to the real estate transactions that supported
the two false tax return charges. He contends that this evidence was unfairly
prejudicial because it established that he made large profits from flipping property in
the period leading up to California’s real estate crash. To prove willfulness in a
prosecution for willfully underreporting taxable income under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1),
the government must show that a defendant intended to violate the law or knew that
his actions would do so. United States v. Claiborne, 765 F.2d 784, 797 (9th Cir.
1985), abrogated on other grounds by Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988). It was
not plain error to permit evidence of the other real estate transactions to refute the
defense that Rahman’s language barrier, his lack of an American education, and his
unfamiliarity with the American tax system prevented him from willfully violating the
tax laws.
AFFIRMED.
4

-- 4 of 4 --