STEVEN DHILLON and RUBY DHILLON v. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEVEN DHILLON and RUBY
DHILLON,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Director,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-17346
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00723-EMC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward M. Chen, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 17, 2013 **
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
FILED
AUG 14 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

-- 1 of 3 --

Steven and Ruby Dhillon appeal the grant of summary judgment to the
government on their claims that they were denied due process of law during Ms.
Dhillon’s removal proceedings and during the adjudication of Mr. Dhillon’s I-130
petition for an immediate relative visa for Ms. Dhillon. Because the parties are
familiar with the history of the case, we need not recount it here. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain
any challenge to Ms. Dhillon’s removal proceedings because “a petition for review
filed with an appropriate court of appeals . . . shall be the sole and exclusive means
for judicial review of an order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The district
court was also correct that the process by which Mr. Dhillon’s I-130 petition was
denied comports with the applicable statutes and regulations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154;
8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2, 103.3.
Finally, we also agree that the Dhillons received constitutionally adequate
due process. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (explaining the factors
to be considered). The Dhillons do not assert that the statements they challenge are
untrue or otherwise challenge the substance of those statements, and they have
never proffered any theory under which the cross examination they seek would
have enhanced or altered the adjudication of Mr. Dhillon’s petition. The Dhillons
2

-- 2 of 3 --

do not challenge the district court’s determination that they make an as-applied
challenge to the due process they received. We hold that the process they received
was adequate because the process they request “could not have made a
determinative difference” in their case. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham
Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981). 1 In particular, there was very little “risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,” and seemingly
no “probable value” from the “additional . . . procedural safeguards” that the
Dhillons seek. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1,
14 (1991) (considering, in an as-applied procedural due process challenge, whether
“the risk of error was substantial in this case”). The second Mathews factor is
dispositive of the Dhillons’ due process claim.
AFFIRMED.
1 In Lassiter, the Supreme Court determined that Ms. Lassiter was not
entitled to counsel in her parental termination proceedings because “presence of
counsel for Ms. Lassiter could not have made a determinative difference” in her
case. 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981). The Supreme Court looked at “all these
circumstances,” in “hold[ing] that the trial court did not err in failing to appoint
counsel for Ms. Lassiter.” Id. at 33; see also id. at 49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for its case-specific determination).
3

-- 3 of 3 --