Michael Seneca v. First Franklin Financial Corporation;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL SENECA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
FIRST FRANKLIN FINANCIAL
CORPORATION; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-57073
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-02329-DMS-
WVG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 18, 2013**
Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Michael Seneca appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging, among other things, violations of the Truth in Lending Act and
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
FILED
JUN 25 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of standing. Del. Valley Surgical
Supply Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008). We
affirm.
Seneca’s claims remain property of his Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate because
they accrued before Seneca filed his bankruptcy petition but were never scheduled
or otherwise administered in his bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(d) (“Unless
the court orders otherwise, property of the estate that is not abandoned under this
section and that is not administered in the case remains property of the estate.”);
Canatella v. Towers (In re Alcala), 918 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1990) (causes of
action which accrued before Chapter 7 petition is filed are part of the estate vested
in the trustee); see also Cheng v. K & S Diversified Invs., Inc. (In re Cheng), 308
B.R. 448, 461 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (“Property of the estate that is not scheduled
or otherwise administered by the time the case is closed remains property of the
estate forever.”). Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Seneca’s
action because Seneca is not the real party in interest and has no standing to pursue
his claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1) (“An action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest.”); see also Estate of Spirtos v. One San
Bernardino Cnty. Superior Court Case Numbered SPR 02211, 443 F.3d 1172,

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11-57073 3
1176 (9th Cir. 2006) (bankruptcy code endows bankruptcy trustee with exclusive
right to sue on behalf of estate).
Seneca’s contentions concerning the lack of oral argument, the propriety of
removal to federal court, the adequacy of the district court’s explanation of its
conclusions, and the district court’s consideration of judicially-noticed bankruptcy
court orders are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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