United States of America v. ALEXANDER GUERRA DE LEON, AKA Eddy Alexander Deleon, AKA Alexander Eddie Guerra

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Michael H. Simon, District Judge for the U.S. District**
Court for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALEXANDER GUERRA DE LEON,
AKA Eddy Alexander Deleon, AKA
Alexander Eddie Guerra,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-50444
D.C. No. 2:12-cr-00249-JFW-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 11, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and SIMON, District Judge.**
Defendant Alexander Guerra De Leon (Guerra) was found illegally in the
United States after having previously been deported, and was charged with
FILED
MAY 30 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Guerra pled guilty without the benefit of a fast-track
plea agreement, and was sentenced to twenty-four months imprisonment and to
three years supervised release. Guerra has timely appealed his sentence. We
affirm the sentence of the district court.
First, the district court did not plainly err in commenting that Guerra would
benefit from rehabilitative treatment in prison. Tapia permits the district court to
“discuss[] the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of
specific treatment or training programs,” and the district court’s comments did not
exceed these permissible bounds by in any way indicating that it modified its
sentence so as to provide Guerra with prison rehabilitation. Tapia v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2382, 2392–95 (2011).
Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Guerra to
a twenty-four month sentence, which falls at the low end of the applicable
Guidelines range. The district court adequately and fully considered the section
3553 factors in determining this sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). That this
sentence is inconsistent with the sentence of a defendant offered a fast-track plea
agreement does not create an unwarranted sentencing disparity. See United States
v. Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 717–18 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the argument
that the defendants’ sentences were impermissibly inconsistent with the sentence of

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similarly-situated defendants who received fast-track dispositions); cf. United
States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2010) (asserting that “[t]he
mere fact that Treadwell can point to a defendant convicted at a different time of a
different fraud and sentenced to a term of imprisonment shorter than Treadwell’s
does not create an ‘unwarranted’ sentencing disparity”).
Finally, the district court did not plainly err by imposing a three-year term of
supervised release. Because the district court could have reasonably concluded
that supervised release “would provide an added measure of deterrence and
protection [of the public] based on the facts and circumstances of [Guerra’s]
particular case,” supervised release was here appropriate under the Sentencing
Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1, cmt. n.5.
AFFIRMED.

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