CURT ALLEN BYRON, AKA Curt-Allen of the Family Byron v. Curtis of the Family Hirotaka

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument, and, therefore, denies plaintiff’s request for oral argument.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CURT ALLEN BYRON, AKA Curt-Allen
of the Family Byron,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CURTIS OF THE FAMILY HIROTAKA,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 12-35006
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-01879-JCC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2013**
Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Curt Allen Byron, aka Curt-Allen of the Family Byron, appeals pro se from
the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
various claims arising from a traffic stop and subsequent arrest. We have
FILED
MAY 21 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Cholla Ready Mix, Inc.
v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004), and may affirm on any ground
supported by the record, Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116,
1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s unlawful search and seizure
claim because plaintiff failed to allege facts demonstrating that defendant
Hirotaka’s request for plaintiff’’s full name, license, registration, and insurance
verification during a valid traffic stop, and his subsequent arrest for failure to
provide the same, were not “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified” the stop. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 188-89
(2004) (state law authorizing police officer to request name or identification during
valid traffic stop, and to arrest persons who fail to comply, is consistent with
Fourth Amendment); see also Wash. Rev. Code §§ 46.61.020, 46.61.021,
10.31.100, and 9A.76.020.
Plaintiff’s due process claim was properly dismissed because plaintiff failed
to allege facts demonstrating that defendant Hirotaka’s conduct in arranging the
towing of plaintiff’s vehicle and trailer or completing Byron’s arrest reports
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hallstrom v. Garden City, 991 F.2d
1473, 1477 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993) (no due process violation where, consistent with an

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independent “community caretaking function,” officer arranged for plaintiff’s
vehicle to be towed after pulling her over for a traffic violation); see also Cholla
Ready Mix, Inc., 382 F.3d at 973 (conclusory allegations and unreasonable
inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss).
The district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim
because plaintiff failed to allege facts demonstrating that disclosing his full name
or providing his license, registration, and insurance documents violated his rights
against self-incrimination. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 190-91 (no Fifth Amendment
violation absent evidence that a person’s refusal to disclose his name was based on
real and appreciable fear that it would be used to incriminate him); United States v.
Bohn, 622 F.3d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 2010) (defendant’s disclosure of name and
identification has no incriminating effect where police officer knows who
defendant is and what he has done, such as where a traffic violation occurs in the
officer’s presence).
We do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, including with
respect to alleged violations of plaintiff’s rights under the Seventh Amendment.
See Brown v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., 108 F.3d 208, 210 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam).

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Plaintiff’s contentions regarding the application and interpretation of various
traffic regulations are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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