Eric W. Bright v. MERCER ADVISORS INCORPORATED, A Corporation

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ERIC W. BRIGHT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MERCER ADVISORS
INCORPORATED, A Corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-16256
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-02196-GMS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 19, 2012**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Eric W. Bright appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his employment discrimination action alleging violations of Title VII and state law.
FILED
JAN 03 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Vasquez v.
County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bright’s
retaliation claims because Bright failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether he engaged in a protected activity. See Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star
Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing the elements
of a prima facie retaliation claim under Title VII, including that the plaintiff was
engaged in protected activity); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411-
12 (9th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff failed to show that he engaged in protected activity
where his complaint to his employer did not indicate a concern about
discrimination).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bright’s racial
discrimination claim because Bright failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were
treated more favorably, or whether defendant acted with discriminatory intent. See
Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640 & n.5 (describing the elements of a prima facie
discrimination claim under Title VII).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bright’s breach of
contract claim because Bright failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
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whether defendant failed to comply with its employee handbook by retaliating
against him or failing to investigate his alleged complaints of discrimination. See
Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini, 83 P.3d 1103, 1111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (describing the
elements of a breach of contract claim under Arizona law).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the scheduling
order to allow defendant to amend its answer because defendant showed good
cause. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir.
1992) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a party seeking to
amend its pleadings after the date set in the scheduling order must show good
cause).
AFFIRMED.
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