Gary Donald Hanneman v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEVADA and ROBERT LEGRAND, Warden

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GARY DONALD HANNEMAN,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF NEVADA and ROBERT LEGRAND,
Warden,
Respondents - Appellees.
No. 10-15835
D.C. No. 3:05-cv-00284-ECR-
VPC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Edward C. Reed, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 6, 2012
San Francisco, California
Before: FARRIS, FERNANDEZ, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
We are familiar with the record. We do not ignore Hanneman’s arguments
nor do we ignore the sentence now faced by Hanneman. Our charge, though, is to
resolve the legal questions presented.
FILED
DEC 06 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Hanneman made a confession that justified his conviction and his conviction
justified his sentence. He argues that he was in custody at the time and that he was
not given his Miranda warnings.
The record provides a detailed analysis of the circumstances surrounding his
interview. We consider whether a reasonable person, under the totality of the
circumstances, would have felt free to end the interrogation and leave. Howes v.
Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012).
Hanneman voluntarily agreed to the interview, drove his own vehicle to the
site, was not restrained, and was told that he was not under arrest and could leave
at any time.
The state court applied the totality of the circumstances test and took into
account “the age of the accused, education and intelligence level of the accused,
police advisement of the accused’s constitutional rights, length of detention, nature
of questioning, and use of any physical punishment.” The court ultimately
concluded that Hanneman was not in custody at the time of his pre-Miranda
confession and that this confession was not coerced, determining that he was
“coherent, well educated, . . . not under the influence of any substance affecting his
mental capacities . . . [, and] was also aware of his rights, having taken courses in
law and criminal justice at the University of Nevada.” Id. Hanneman fails to

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demonstrate that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal
law. The court analyzed all of the circumstances surrounding Hanneman’s
interview and, based on its analysis, concluded that he was not in custody and his
confession was not coerced. Hanneman argues that the officers’ interviewing
tactics–including telling him that they would need to interview fewer children if he
confessed–and his ignorance about his constitutional rights mandate a finding that
his confession was coerced. Neither point is dispositive under the applicable
totality of the circumstances test. Hanneman has failed to meet the AEDPA’s rigid
standard for granting habeas relief: that “fairminded jurists could [not] disagree”
on what the outcome should have been. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770,
786 (2011). Similarly, the state courts could properly determine that the advice
Hanneman received while in custody sufficiently informed him of his rights for the
purpose of his second interview.
Hanneman also fails to show that the state court unreasonably determined
the facts based on the record presented.
Our inquiry is whether the state court’s decision was so flawed that
Hanneman is entitled to habeas relief. It was not. There was also no unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law.
We must deny the request for relief.

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AFFIRMED.

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