Chen Hale v. Vacaville Housing Authority

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHEN HALE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
VACAVILLE HOUSING AUTHORITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-15693
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00391-JAM-
KJN
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 13, 2012**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Chen Hale appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her
action alleging that the Vacaville Housing Authority (“VHA”) discriminated
against her on the basis of her national origin and disability by terminating her
FILED
NOV 29 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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participation in the Section 8 housing assistance program. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of
Carson, 640 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2011), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Hale’s claims regarding the merits of
VHA’s decision to terminate her assistance because Hale is precluded under the
doctrine of exhaustion of judicial remedies from relitigating the merits in federal
court. See Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir.
2002) (federal courts accord state administrative adjudications the same preclusive
effect they would have in state court); Runyon v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ.,
229 P.3d 985, 994 (Cal. 2010) (“Generally speaking, if a complainant fails to
overturn an adverse administrative decision by writ of mandate, and if the
administrative proceeding possessed the requisite judicial character, the
administrative decision is binding in a later civil action brought in superior court.”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Hale’s claims under the Americans
with Disabilities Act and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because Hale
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that VHA terminated her Section 8
assistance on account of her national origin or because of her disability. See
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 522 (9th Cir. 2011) (Title

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VI prohibits only intentional discrimination); Weinreich v. L.A. Cnty. Metro.
Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that to show a
violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that the denial of benefits or
discrimination was “by reason of [her] disability”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Hale’s state law claims after dismissing her federal
claims without leave to amend. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We construe the
dismissal of the state law claims to be without prejudice. See Gini v. Las Vegas
Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994).
Hale’s contention that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
grant leave to amend her complaint sua sponte is unpersuasive.
We do not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. See Smith v.
Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999). We also do not consider any
documents that are not part of the district court record. See Kirshner v. Uniden
Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1988).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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