Taiwan Civil Rights Litigation Organization, (tcrlo) v. KUOMINTANG BUSINESS MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, (KBMC), AKA The Kuomintang of China, (KMT)

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TAIWAN CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
ORGANIZATION, (TCRLO),
Plaintiff,
and
FORT NIGHT HOLDINGS LLC and
PACIFIC SENTRY ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
KUOMINTANG BUSINESS
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE,
(KBMC), AKA The Kuomintang of China,
(KMT),
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-17717
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00362-JW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
James Ware, District Judge, Presiding
FILED
OCT 17 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
11-17717 2
Submitted October 9, 2012**
Before: RAWLINSON, MURGUIA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Fort Night Holdings LLC and Pacific Sentry Associates, LLC
appeal from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging quasi-
contract and other claims as barred by the statute of limitations. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. See Stanley v. Trs. of
Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.
The district court properly concluded that plaintiffs’ quasi-contract claim
began to accrue in 1950 and, thus, was barred by the statute of limitations. See
Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Eoff Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2008)
(under California law “[a] cause of action accrues when the claim is complete with
all of its elements”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs’ first
amended complaint without leave to amend after concluding that the quasi-contract
claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that the related claims similarly
failed. See id. at 1060 (where plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of
limitations, amendment would be futile).

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11-17717 3
Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the district court did not err by addressing
the statute of limitations issue sua sponte in ruling on plaintiffs’ motion for default
judgment. See Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 686-87 (9th Cir.
1993) (permitting district courts to sua sponte consider the issue of statute of
limitations where defendant has not waived the defense and plaintiff has been
given a chance to address the issue); Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th
Cir. 1986) (requiring district courts in addressing a motion for default judgment to
evaluate the “sufficiency of the complaint”).
Plaintiffs’ contentions regarding the statute of repose are unavailing because
their claims would still be untimely.
AFFIRMED.

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