William D. Webster v. State of Washington, doing business as State of Washington Department of Retirement…

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM D. WEBSTER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON, doing
business as State of Washington
Department of Retirement Systems,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-35014
D.C. No. 3:09-cv-05776-RBL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 10, 2012**
Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
William D. Webster appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action arising from a state court’s property division order in his
FILED
SEP 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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11-35014 2
marital dissolution. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo the district court’s dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Carmona
v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Webster’s action as barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the action is a “forbidden de facto appeal” of the
state court’s order regarding Webster’s pension benefits. Id. at 1050-51 (Rooker-
Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claims seeking to enjoin state family court
orders regarding pension benefits); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474
F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim
because alleged legal injuries arose from the “state court’s purportedly erroneous
judgment” and the relief he sought “would require the district court to determine
that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).
AFFIRMED.

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