Dai Nguyen v. Sacramento County;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAI NGUYEN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SACRAMENTO COUNTY; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-17451
D.C. No. 2:03-cv-02635-MCE-
EFB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 10, 2012**
Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Dai Nguyen appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional
violations that occurred while he was a pretrial detainee. We have jurisdiction
FILED
SEP 24 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 3 --

11-17451 2
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,
1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nguyen’s claim
against defendant Blanas because Nguyen failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to Blanas’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional
deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between Blanas’s alleged wrongful
conduct and the constitutional deprivation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth requirements for supervisory liability).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nguyen’s claims
against the remaining defendants because Nguyen failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether the alleged constitutional violations were
proximately caused by defendants’ conduct under an official county policy,
custom, practice, or procedure. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
691 (1978) (setting forth requirements for a § 1983 claim of municipal liability).
Nguyen’s contention that the district court misapplied the burden of proof is
unpersuasive. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (“[A]
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”).

-- 2 of 3 --

11-17451 3
To the extent that Nguyen contends he should have been allowed to amend
his complaint to add additional defendants, Nguyen waived this issue by failing to
raise it sufficiently in the district court. See One Indus., LLC v. Jim O’Neal
Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A party normally may not
press an argument on appeal that it failed to raise in the district court.”).
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --