United States of America v. Jolaine Lee Flammond

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOLAINE LEE FLAMMOND,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-30242
D.C. No. 4:11-cr-00009-SEH-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 12, 2012
Seattle, Washington
Before: SCHROEDER, REINHARDT, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jolaine Flammond appeals the 84-month sentence imposed following her
guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of actual
(pure) methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
FILED
JUL 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2
The court properly imposed a two-level sentencing enhancement for
possession of a firearm during the commission of her offense pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1. Flammond concedes in her Reply Brief that she purchased three firearms
and gave them to her drug suppliers. Flammond possessed the firearms when she
purchased them, and her possession was related to her drug offense because she
gave the firearms to her drug suppliers. See United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366,
1372 (9th Cir. 1993). Flammond’s acquisition of firearms for her co-conspirators
disqualified her for the safety valve described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which does
not apply where the defendant possessed a firearm in connection with the offense.
The district court did not err by including, in its calculation of the total
amount of methamphetamine for sentencing purposes, the 200 grams of
methamphetamine that Flammond admitted purchasing for distribution over the
course of the conspiracy. The court was required to consider “all acts” that were
“part of the same course of conduct . . . as the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G
§ 1B1.3(a)(2). Here, the course of conduct includes all the methamphetamine she
purchased for distribution. The amount for sentencing was not limited to the
amount of “pure” methamphetamine she possessed at the time of arrest. See
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) cmt. n.3; United States v. Demers, 13 F.3d 1381, 1385 (9th
Cir. 1994).

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Finally, Flammond contends that her sentence is unreasonable, but her
argument is not persuasive. The district court considered her personal history and,
specifically, her efforts at rehabilitation. The sentencing transcript shows that the
court explained with particularity why it rejected Flammond’s sentencing position.
See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008). Under the totality of
the circumstances—including the large quantities of methamphetamine distributed,
Flammond’s purchase of firearms for upper-level drug suppliers, and the number
of people involved—the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing
Flammond’s sentence, which is within the Guidelines.
Flammond’s motion of March 14, 2012, to submit supplemental excerpts of
record under seal is GRANTED, and the excerpts are ordered filed.
AFFIRMED.

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