Raymond Galusha; v. Margaret V. Dowling;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAYMOND GALUSHA; et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MARGARET V. DOWLING; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-56810
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-04573-PSG-PJW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2012 **
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Raymond Galusha and Anne Waters appeal pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing their action alleging that defendants violated their due process
rights, conspired to defraud them, and that defendant Dowling breached a contract
with Waters. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo
FILED
JUL 11 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction, CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne,
Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2011), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the claims against Romero for lack of
personal jurisdiction because Galusha and Waters failed to establish that personal
jurisdiction existed over her. See id. at 1073, 1076 (discussing requirement for a
district court sitting in California to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant and explaining that a court does not “assume the truth of
allegations in a pleading which are contradicted by affidavit” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed the claims against Huling for lack of
personal jurisdiction because Galusha and Waters failed to establish that specific
personal jurisdiction existed over her based on her actions as a New Mexico judge
presiding over litigation brought by Galusha and Waters in a New Mexico court.
See id.; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
416-17 (1984) (unilateral activities by plaintiff are not sufficient to establish
purposeful availment).
The district court properly dismissed the contract claim against Dowling
because Galusha and Waters failed to establish that Dowling purposefully availed
herself of the privilege of conducting business in California based on the relevant

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contracts. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801-02
(9th Cir. 2004) (discussing purposeful availment standard, which is “most often
used in suits sounding in contract”).
The district court properly dismissed the tort claims against Dowling and
Weems because Galusha and Waters failed to establish that the alleged actions
satisfied the purposeful direction standard. See Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon
& Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing standard). We do
not consider arguments regarding personal jurisdiction raised by Galusha and
Waters for the first time on appeal. See Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 953
F.2d 510, 515 (9th Cir. 1992).
AFFIRMED.

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