Denise Steffens v. Regus Group, Plc;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DENISE STEFFENS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
REGUS GROUP, PLC; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-55379
D.C. No. 3:08-cv-01494-LAB-
WVG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 5, 2012
Pasadena, California
Before: B. FLETCHER, WARDLAW, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Denise Steffens (“Steffens”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to her former employer, Regus Group, PLC (“Regus”), on her claim for
wrongful termination in violation of California public policy. We reverse and
remand for trial.
FILED
JUN 26 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Mark H. v. Hamamoto,
620 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010). In California, an employer may be subject to
tort liability for wrongful termination if the termination violates a fundamental
public policy. Gould v. Md. Sound Indus., Inc., 31 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 1147
(1995). Claims for wrongful termination “typically arise when an employer
retaliates against an employee for refusing to violate a statute, performing a
statutory obligation, exercising a statutory right, or reporting an alleged violation
of a statute of public importance.” Id. An employee is not required to report the
violation to a government or law enforcement agency; internal reporting is
sufficient. Id. at 1150.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that she engaged in a protected activity, her employer subjected her to an adverse
employment action, and there was a causal link between the protected activity and
the employer’s action. Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69
(2000). Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer has the
burden to provide a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment
action. Id. at 68. If the employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse
employment action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s alleged
reason is a pretext for the discriminatory motive. Id.

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There is no dispute that Steffens established a prima facie case of retaliation.
The only dispute is whether Steffens can demonstrate that Regus’s proferred
justification for terminating Steffens’s employment—poor performance—was
pretextual. Steffens alleges that the real reason Regus terminated her employment
was because she complained to her supervisors about the company’s policy of
denying meal and rest breaks to hourly employees in violation of California law.
We conclude that Steffens presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of
fact regarding whether Regus’s proffered justification for terminating Steffens was
pretextual.
Prior to her termination, Steffens worked for Regus or its predecessor for
more than ten years. She managed a commercial center in San Diego, California.
During her tenure with the company, she consistently received positive
performance evaluations. In fact, in July 2006, just three months before the critical
incident in this litigation, Steffens received an “Exceeds Expectations” or “Meets
Expectations” rating in every category on her performance appraisal. She also
received a merits-based bonus at that time.
In October 2006, she met for the first time with Sande Golgart, the
company’s new Regional Vice President. After touring the center, Steffens,
Golgart, and Steffens’s immediate supervisor, Shannon Jones, met to discuss the

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center’s performance and potential opportunities for growth. During that meeting,
Steffens alleges that she complained to Golgart about the company’s policy to deny
meal and rest breaks to its hourly employees. Immediately thereafter, Steffens says
Golgart fell silent. No one spoke for two or three minutes. Jones’s deposition
testimony corroborates this event. (“[W]hen [Steffens] brought up the topic . . .
[Golgart] became very quiet, sitting and not speaking to a point where it became
very uncomfortable.”). Golgart then stood up, and, with hardly another word, left
the meeting. Jones testified that Golgart then said “Steffens was a problem,” and
that Jones should “start putting a plan together to have [Steffens] removed” and
“begin looking for a replacement.” Golgart’s reaction to Steffens’s allegations of
unlawful conduct—silence and an abrupt exit—and Jones’s testimony constitute
evidence of pretext.
Jones also testified that, in his opinion, one of the reasons Steffens was put
on a performance improvement plan was “for her bringing up matters in regards to
her teams’ - - her hourly teams’ breaks and being able to properly staff the center.”
When asked for the basis of his opinion, Jones said that “[Steffens] was more
upfront about [the meal and rest breaks] issues than anyone else in the area, and
more open and more confrontational about those topics.” Jones’s deposition

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testimony suggests that Golgart decided to fire Steffens because of her allegations
and is additional evidence of pretext.
Finally, Jones testified that he and Golgart worked together to put Steffens
on an “aggressive” plan with “the purpose of . . . get[ting] rid of Denise Steffens.”
Jones testified that these discussions started in 2006, and that during the action
plan process, there was never an intent to keep Steffens employed with Regus.
Based on this evidence, we conclude that Steffens presented sufficient
evidence of pretext to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the real reason
for her termination. We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on the wrongful termination claim and remand for trial.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

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