United States of America v. Justin Lyle Izatt

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JUSTIN LYLE IZATT,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-30089
D.C. No. 1:10-cr-00112-EJL-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 8, 2012**
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, BYBEE, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Justin Izatt appeals from his conviction and sentence for possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(A). Izatt argues that the district court (1) erred in denying his motion to
FILED
MAY 10 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we state them1
only as necessary to explain our decision.
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suppress evidence found after a search of his residence, (2) imposed a mandatory
life sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and (3) abused its discretion in
admitting prior bad acts evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.1
1. Motion to Suppress
Izatt argues that the district court should have granted his motion to
suppress, because (1) the terms of his state probation, which allow the police to
search his residence, were “tolled” at the time of the search of his residence, and
(2) the police did not have reasonable suspicion to search his residence. We
review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress de novo, and the
underlying factual findings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mayer, 560
F.3d 948, 956 (9th Cir. 2009).
At the time of the search of his residence, Izatt was on state probation for a
misdemeanor conviction for driving without privileges. As part of his probation
agreement, Izatt agreed to submit to warrantless searches. The terms of Izatt’s
probation were not tolled at the time of the search. Although the state government
had petitioned to have Izatt’s probation revoked, at the time of the search on

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We need not consider the question whether any suspicion is required for a2
search of a probationer pursuant to a search condition because we conclude that the
police officers had reasonable suspicion to search Izatt’s residence. See United
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). Izatt was found with a used
methamphetamine pipe on his person, the police had information from a
confidential informant that Izatt stored methamphetamine in his garage, Izatt’s
probation officer told the police that Izatt was likely using and dealing
methamphetamine, and Izatt was “increasingly nervous” and “shaking
uncontrollably” at the time of the arrest in front of his residence.
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February 3, 2010, Izatt was awaiting a hearing for a final decision on the proposed
termination of probation. Izatt cites State v. Harvey, 132 P.3d 1255 (Idaho Ct.
App. 2006), in support of his argument that the terms were tolled, but Harvey
stands only for the proposition that a probationer who breaks the terms of his
probation and avoids probationary supervision by leaving the state without
permission should not receive credit for probation time served. Id. at 1259.
Harvey does not hold that the terms of probation are tolled.2
2. Eighth Amendment Challenge
Izatt argues that his mandatory life sentence, provided by 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A), violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishments. We review Eighth Amendment challenges to a sentence de novo.
United States v. Meiners, 485 F.3d 1211, 1212 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
Izatt’s argument fails. The government filed a notice that it intended to seek
this sentencing enhancement prior to trial, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a), as it was

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required to do. Izatt’s sentence does not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment. See
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (holding that a life sentence for a
single conviction of possessing 672 grams of cocaine did not violate the Eighth
Amendment); United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding a
life sentence on similar facts where defendant was sentenced to life in prison after
two prior felony convictions).
3. 404(b) Evidence
We review the district court’s ruling to admit prior bad acts evidence under
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ramirez-Robles, 386
F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2004). Izatt argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it admitted “prior bad acts” evidence showing that Izatt had used a
purple Crown Royal bag to store drug paraphernalia in one of his prior felony drug
convictions.
The district court was correct in stating that such evidence was relevant to
show a “common plan or scheme.” The evidence was also relevant to show modus
operandi, made the more relevant to this case because Izatt’s opening statement
claimed he had nothing to do with the methamphetamine found along with the
purple Crown Royal bag in the ceiling of his garage. Further, the district court was
correct that the evidence here met the four factors for the admissibility of 404(b)

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evidence outlined in Ramirez-Robles, 386 F.3d at 1242. First, it proves a material
element of the offense for which Izatt was charged, namely “ownership” or
“knowing possession” of the drugs. Second, Izatt’s prior conviction for possession
of amphetamine with intent to deliver is nearly identical to the crime charged here.
Third, Izatt’s prior actions resulted in a conviction, so there is sufficient evidence
that he indeed committed the crime. Fourth, the prior conviction was not too
remote in time: while over eight years had passed, this court has upheld the
introduction of prior bad acts evidence more remote in time. See United States v.
Johnson, 132 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1997).
The evidence was also admissible under Rule 403. “As long as it appears
from the record as a whole that the trial judge adequately weighed the probative
value and prejudicial effect of proffered evidence before its admission . . . the
demands of Rule 403 have been met.” Boyd v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco,
576 F.3d 938, 948 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). The record supports the
district court’s conclusion that the 404(b) evidence is “probative and is not unduly
prejudicial, as the Crown Royal bags go to the facts of this case, along with the
pipes, and do not go to the mere propensity of [Izatt] to commit a crime of this
nature.”
AFFIRMED.

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