United States of America v. ALEX TORRES IBARRA, AKA Alex Ibarra Torres

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALEX TORRES IBARRA, AKA Alex
Ibarra Torres,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-10308
D.C. No. 4:09-cr-01733-RCC-
JCG-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 18, 2012**
San Francisco, California
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, N.R. SMITH and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
We affirm the conviction of Alex Torres-Ibarra (“Torres”) for twenty-one
charges of Aiding and Abetting False Statements During Purchase of Firearms, in
FILED
APR 30 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924 (a)(1)(A) and 2(a), and one count of Engaging in the
Business of Dealing Firearms without a License, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(a)(1)(A) and 924(a)(1)(D).
The district court had jurisdiction over violations of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 924(a)(1)(A) and 922(a)(1)(A), whether or not an interstate commerce nexus is
alleged or included in the text of the statute. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17
(2005); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 833 (1974). In addition, the
interstate commerce nexus is not an element required to be charged for violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). United States v. Redus, 469 F.2d 185, 187-88 (9th Cir.
1972).
The clear and detailed statutory and regulatory requirements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(1)(A) are not unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Jae Gab
Kim, 449 F.3d 933, 942 (9th Cir. 2006). These requirements apply to the false
representations Torres aided and abetted in this case.
The indictment sufficiently alleged aiding and abetting, because this charge
is embedded in every federal crime. United States v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 820
(9th Cir. 2005). Even assuming any deficiency, Torres has not shown that he was
prejudiced, because he was fairly informed of the charges against him. Hagner v.
United States, 285 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1932).

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There was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support Torres’
convictions for aiding and abetting, id. at 431, because 1) Torres was the one who
took the “orders” for the firearm purchases, believing that the ultimate purchaser
could not buy firearms himself because he was not a United States citizen; 2)
Torres contacted his cousin and directed him to purchase certain types and
quantities of firearms, because Torres believed he was prohibited from purchasing
firearms due to an outstanding arrest warrant; 3) after Torres’ cousin purchased the
firearms, Torres then provided the firearms to the ultimate purchaser and gave a
“cut” of his profits to his cousin; and 4) Torres admitted that he knew what he was
doing was wrong, and it was his fault for getting his cousin involved in trouble.
Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,”
United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), the district
court did not err by concluding that, since Torres was the one who directed his
cousin’s activities and told his cousin how to go about purchasing the firearms, it
was reasonable for the jury to infer that Torres aided and abetted his cousin.
Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that Torres knew that the identity of the
purchaser was important for the purchase of a firearm, and that a misrepresentation
of identity was necessary for his cousin to purchase the firearms on Torres’ behalf.
AFFIRMED.

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