United States of America v. Stanley William Taylor, Jr.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as*
provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable James G. Carr, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for***
the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
STANLEY WILLIAM TAYLOR, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 10-10583
D.C. No. 2:10-CR-00101-SRB-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 30, 2011**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and CARR, Senior District
Judge.***
Stanley Taylor, Jr., appeals from a conviction on one count of Conspiracy to
Possess Marijuana with Intent to Distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. We
FILED
JAN 30 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, we
will not recount them here.
Taylor contends that the district court erred in allowing the government’s
expert witness to testify when the expert witness did not provide his report until the
first day of trial. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) requires that,
“[a]t the defendant's request, the government must give to the defendant a written
summary of any testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702,
703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial.”
Further, “[t]he summary provided . . . must describe the witness's opinions, the
bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications.” Id. Rule
16(a)(1)(F) requires that the defendant be able to inspect any report to be used in
the government’s case-in-chief once it becomes available to the government. In
this instance, the government did precisely what it was required to do in as timely a
fashion as it could.
Government counsel warned Taylor’s attorney months in advance about the
government’s intent to produce an handwriting expert witness. At no point before
the government made its report available did it lead Taylor to believe that it was
not going to produce that witness.

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To be sure, the government properly told Taylor’s attorney that the expert’s
initial assessment was inconclusive as to a comparison between the exemplar
Taylor submitted and the questioned document. Thereafter, however, the
government told the attorney that it was procuring another example (from an
independent source) for comparison.
Taylor’s attorney did nothing in response to this notice, which came about a
week before trial. Taylor cannot now claim that the government lulled him into
believing that any expert handwriting testimony would not be inculpatory.
In any event, the government delivered the expert’s report within moments
of receiving it itself. Though this was on the first day of trial, time remained within
which Taylor could prepare for the now likely inculpatory testimony. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mendoza-Paz, 286 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Finley, 301 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2002) (analyzing the mirror Rule 16 provision for
defense counsel).
Taylor, moreover, did not seek a continuance to enable him to find and
obtain a report from his own expert. Before he can seek relief here, he must have
made some effort, at least, to avoid the harm below.
The district court properly allowed the government to call its handwriting
expert in its case-in-chief.

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AFFIRMED.

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