Rodolfo Velasquez v. PATRICK R. DONAHOE, United States Postal Service

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Velasquez’s
request for oral argument is denied.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RODOLFO VELASQUEZ,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PATRICK R. DONAHOE, United States
Postal Service,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 10-16274
D.C. No. 3:08-cv-02520-JSW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 19, 2011**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Rodolfo Velasquez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his employment action alleging disability discrimination in violation
of the Rehabilitation Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
FILED
JAN 06 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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review de novo. Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir.
2007). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Velasquez
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he suffered
discrimination because of his disability. See id. (“To state a prima facie case under
the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that . . . [he] suffered
discrimination because of [his] disability.”). Even assuming that Velasquez raised
a triable dispute as to the prima facie case, Velasquez failed to raise a triable
dispute as to whether the United States Postal Service’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for assigning him to a new job position was pretextual.
See Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2004)
(same analysis under Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”)); Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093-94 (9th
Cir. 2001) (under the ADA, if an employee establishes a prima facie case and the
employer provides a nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action, the employee
must raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext).
We are not persuaded by Velasquez’s remaining contentions, including
those regarding the district court’s decision not to allow his witness to testify at the
summary judgment hearing. See Thompson v. Mahre, 110 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir.

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1997) (“[O]rdinarily there is no such thing as an evidentiary hearing . . . on a
summary judgment motion.”).
AFFIRMED.

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