Michael Sattari v. Washington Mutual, a Washington corporation

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL SATTARI,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WASHINGTON MUTUAL, a
Washington corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 10-17433
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00768-KJD-PAL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submission Deferred August 10, 2011
Submitted December 23, 2011
San Francisco, California
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, O’SCANNLAIN and GRABER, Circuit
Judges.
Sattari mistakenly referenced California statutes rather than Nevada statutes
throughout his complaint. Because Sattari was a pro se litigant when he wrote the
complaint, we construe it liberally to infer that he meant to reference Nevada law.
FILED
DEC 23 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 3 --

page 2
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (“[A] pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Sattari claims the bank engaged in unfair business practices. Under the
Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA), “[a]n action may be brought by
any person who is a victim of consumer fraud.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.600(1). A
claim under the NDTPA requires a “victim of consumer fraud to prove that (1) an
act of consumer fraud by the defendant (2) caused (3) damage to the plaintiff.”
Picus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 651, 658 (D. Nev. 2009) (order).
Consumer fraud encompasses deceptive practices, such as “[k]nowingly mak[ing
a] . . . false representation in a transaction.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0915(15).
Sattari does not raise a genuine issue of material fact that would show that the bank
made a false representation, so this claim fails.
Sattari mentions wrongful foreclosure and emotional distress in his brief, but
doesn’t “specifically and distinctly” argue these claims. Miller v. Fairchild Indus.,
Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The Court of Appeals will not ordinarily
consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and distinctly argued in
appellant’s opening brief.”). We require a brief to contain “appellant’s contentions
and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on

-- 2 of 3 --

page 3
which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A). Sattari provides neither
any argument nor supporting authority. Therefore, he has waived any claims based
on wrongful foreclosure and emotional distress.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --