United States of America v. TERRANCE GEORGE TUCKER, AKA Terry Tucker

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRANCE GEORGE TUCKER, AKA
Terry Tucker,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 09-50612
D.C. No. 2:08-cr-01404-R-1
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SONYA DELORES WODKE TUCKER,
AKA Cheri Tucker, AKA Sonya Tucker,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 09-50625
D.C. No. 2:08-cr-01404-R-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 10-50127
D.C. No. 2:08-cr-01404-R-1
FILED
DEC 22 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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** The Honorable Richard Mills, Senior District Judge for the United
States District Court, Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
Terrance Tucker expressly waived any challenge to the restitution order1
and agreed to dismissal of Appeal No. 10-50127.
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v.
TERRANCE GEORGE TUCKER, AKA
Terry Tucker,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 18, 2011
Pasadena, California
Before: W. FLETCHER and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and MILLS, Senior
District Judge.**
Appellants, Terrance Tucker (Terrance) and Sonya Tucker (Sonya) pled
guilty to two counts of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2)(b). They1
now assert that the district court did not rule on their objections as to the loss
amount, the district court did not adequately explain its reasoning, and that their
sentences are unreasonable. Sonya also challenges the district court’s denial of her
request for a continuance.

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1. When determining monetary loss, the district court may utilize various
methods, which do not have to be precise. See United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d
1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court based its loss calculation on
“[p]resentence reports, all schedules and exhibits submitted by the parties, and the
arguments of government counsel at the time of the hearing . . .” The evidence
upon which the district court relied included financial spreadsheets detailing the
amount of loss. Because the district court may employ various methods to
determine monetary loss, its estimate of loss was not clearly erroneous. See
Berger, 587 F.3d at 1045.
2. The district court explained that it imposed the sentences because of
Terrance and Sonya’s roles in the crimes, their knowledge of the industry, and their
relationship with the victims. As the district court adequately explained its
straightforward sentences that were within (Terrance) and below (Sonya) the
Guidelines range, no procedural error occurred. See United States v. Ressam, 629
F.3d 793, 824 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended.
3. Relying on Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), Terrance
asserted for the first time on appeal that there was a lack of empirical evidence to

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support application of U.S.S.G. §2B1.1. Just because a crime falls within a
Kimbrough exception does not mean the district court must vary from the
Guidelines. See United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 964 (9th Cir. 2011).
Moreover, when the district court does not have a policy disagreement with the
Guidelines, it is not obligated to apply a variance. See id. Accordingly, no plain
error occurred. See United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 2008),
as amended.
The district court is not required to list in detail the § 3553(a) factors it
considered. See Ressam, 629 F.3d at 826. As long as the record supports that the
sentence imposed is logical and consistent with the § 3553(a) factors, the sentence
is reasonable. See id. at 827-28. Terrance's sentence was at the low end of the
Guidelines range and Sonya's was below the Guidelines range. Both were
reasonable. See Ressam, 629 F.3d at 824 (explaining that a sentence within the
Guidelines range is usually reasonable).
4. The district court has discretion to deny a continuance. See United
States v. Kloehn, 620 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010). Because Sonya failed to
establish any prejudice that resulted from the denial, there was no abuse of the
court’s discretion. See id. at 1128.

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AFFIRMED.

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