Vera J. Emma v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Suzanne B. Conlon, United States District Judge for***
the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VERA J. EMMA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 10-55799
D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00832-WQH-
WMC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 7, 2011**
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and CONLON, District Judge.***
FILED
DEC 20 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Appellant Vera Emma (“Emma”) challenges the district court’s decision to
uphold the Commissioner of Social Security’s determination that Emma was not
disabled for purposes of eligibility for supplemental security income.
Emma’s application for benefits was denied by the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) on March 28, 2007. At the hearing, at which Emma was
represented by counsel, the ALJ determined that Emma had a residual functional
capacity with no exertional limitations and she had the ability to perform nonpublic
simple and repetitive tasks. Based on this determination, the ALJ concluded at
Step Five of the Sequential Analysis that Emma was not disabled because jobs
existed in the national economy that she could perform. See 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(v). In making his determination, the ALJ relied on inconsistencies
in the medical evidence. Specifically, the ALJ found that treating physician Dr.
Nicole Esposito’s reports contradicted one another. The ALJ further found that Dr.
Esposito’s reports contradicted the reports of other treating and non-examining
physicians who concluded that Emma was able to perform nonpublic simple and
repetitive tasks. As a result, the ALJ did not give controlling weight to the opinion
and conclusions of Dr. Esposito.
The ALJ did not err in declining to give controlling weight to the opinion of
treating physician Dr. Esposito. To reject the opinion of a treating physician that
conflicts with the opinion of another doctor, the ALJ must make findings setting

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forth “specific and legitimate reasons” for doing so that are supported by
substantial evidence in the record. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.
1995). Dr. Esposito’s post-appointment reports are contradicted by other reports
she prepared regarding Emma’s mental and behavioral health. Moreover, the
reports by Emma’s other treating and non-examining physicians constitute
substantial evidence for denying Emma benefits.
Thus the ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinion
of Dr. Esposito. The ALJ’s denial of benefits is supported by substantial evidence
in the record.
AFFIRMED.

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