United States of America v. GEOFREDO JAMES LITTLEBIRD, Jr.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Ralph B. Guy, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge for the United**
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GEOFREDO JAMES LITTLEBIRD, Jr.,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-30047
D.C. No. 1:10-cr-00041-RFC-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Richard F. Cebull, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2011
Seattle, Washington
Before: GUY, McKEOWN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.**
Geofredo James Littlebird, Jr., appeals the denial of his motion to suppress
statements he made to investigators after an illegal traffic stop. Littlebird argues
that his inculpatory statements should be suppressed because those statements were
FILED
DEC 15 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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the product of a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Notwithstanding the
government’s concession that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment, we
conclude that intervening events sufficiently attenuated Littlebird’s subsequent
statements from the taint of that illegality and we affirm.
“We review de novo the mixed question of fact and law whether evidence
deriving from an illegal search is sufficiently tainted to require suppression,
because legal concepts must be applied and judgment exercised about the values
that animate the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d
567, 575–76 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Johns, 891 F.2d 243, 244 (9th
Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The admissibility of Littlebird’s statements depends upon whether those
statements were “come at by exploitation of . . . illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975) directs us to consider, as a threshold
requirement, the voluntariness of the confession and whether Miranda warnings
were given. Then, to decide if suppression is necessary, we must balance the three
Brown factors: (1) the temporal proximity of the violation and the confession; (2)

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the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct. Id.
Here the threshold requirement of voluntariness is easily met because
Littlebird concedes he voluntarily made the inculpatory statements after receiving
Miranda warnings.
Turning to the first of the Brown factors, Littlebird remained in custody for
two days between the stop and the interview. This alone is neither so long nor so
short as to weigh either against or in favor of suppression. See Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 220 (1979) (Stevens, J. concurring).
More importantly, significant intervening circumstances exist to sufficiently
purge the taint of the illegal stop. First, prior to the interview, Littlebird was
arraigned in the Crow Tribal Court and received appointed counsel. Second, the
record reflects that Littlebird himself likely initiated the interview with the
investigating officers. Third, before the interview he spoke with his Tribal
counsel—a crucial factor in attenuation. United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550,
555 (9th Cir. 1981). And finally, his counsel was present during the entire
interview.
The traffic stop was plainly illegal as the government concedes that the
officer did not have the requisite level of suspicion to stop the car in which

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Littlebird was a passenger. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that the stop
was exploited to gain the confession from Littlebird, especially in light of the
district court’s finding that Littlebird more likely than not initiated the interview.
On balance, the district court properly concluded that the factors above
weigh in favor of denying Littlebird’s motion to suppress his statements.
AFFIRMED.

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