Noruma Orue, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated persons v. Ford Motor Service Company

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NORUMA ORUE, individually and on
behalf of other similarly situated persons,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
FORD MOTOR SERVICE COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY
LLC,
Defendant.
No. 10-55572
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-04250-DDP-CT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 6, 2011
Pasadena, California
Before: B. FLETCHER, SILVERMAN, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
FILED
DEC 13 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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2
Noruma Orue appeals the district court’s March 30, 2010, grant of summary
judgment in favor of Ford Motor Service Company. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The district court correctly concluded that the service contract sold by Ford
did not violate the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal Civ. Code §§ 1790
et seq., because it provided additional benefits not available under the
manufacturer’s express warranty. Under Song-Beverly, a service contract may run
concurrently with a manufacturer’s express warranty if “the contract covers items
or costs not covered by the express warranty or . . . the contract provides relief to
the purchaser not available under the express warranty.” Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1794.41(a)(3). We agree with the district court that the plain language of the
statute permits a service contract to overlap or run concurrently with an express
warranty so long as it provides some additional benefits not contained in the
express warranty.
Here, Ford’s service contract provided three benefits not covered by the
manufacturer’s warranty: (1) emergency travel expense reimbursement up to $500;
(2) destination assistance of up to $75 in the event that the vehicle became disabled
due to collision or failure; and (3) one additional annual fuel delivery service.
Thus, the service contract did not violate Song-Beverly, and the district court

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Orue’s motion to certify the legality of Ford’s service contract to the1
California Supreme Court is DENIED as moot.
3
correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Ford. See Miklosy v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 188 P.3d 629, 636 (Cal. 2008) (“If the statutory language is
unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain
meaning of the statute controls.”).
The district court also properly granted summary judgment as to Orue’s
claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code § 17200. As Orue agreed before the district court, resolution of the unfair
competition claim turns entirely on the court’s interpretation of Song-Beverly.
Because we conclude that Ford’s service contract did not violate Song-Beverly,
Orue’s UCL claim fails as a matter of law.1
AFFIRMED.

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