James R. Davis v. County of Maui

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES R. DAVIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF MAUI; CHARMAINE
TAVARES, Mayor of County of Maui;
DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY,
COUNTY OF MAUI; JEFFREY K. ENG,
Director of Department of Water Supply,
County of Maui; BOARD OF WATER
SUPPLY, COUNTY OF MAUI; DOES 1-
5, INCLUSIVE,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-16261
D.C. No. 1:10-cv-00070-KSC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Kevin S. Chang, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 7, 2011
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TALLMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
FILED
OCT 19 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2
Plaintiff-Appellant James R. Davis (Davis) appeals the district court’s
decision granting Defendants-Appellees’ motion to dismiss his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action and denying his motion to amend his complaint. Because the parties are
familiar with the factual and procedural history of this case, we do not recount
additional facts except as necessary to explain the decision. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(3) and 1291, and we affirm.
“Federal courts must accord a state court judgment the same preclusive
effect that the judgment would receive in the rendering state’s courts.” Skysign
Int’l, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1738). “This rule extends to state administrative adjudications of legal
and factual issue[s].” Id. (citing Misischia v. Pirie, 60 F.3d 626, 629 (9th Cir.
1995)). However, “[t]o have preclusive effect in federal court, the state
administrative determination must [also] satisfy the requirements of fairness set out
in” United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
Misischia, 60 F.3d at 629.
Hawaii state courts give preclusive effect to an administrative agency’s
findings if “(1) the issue decided in the prior action is identical to the issue in the
current action, (2) a final judgment on the merits was issued, and (3) the parties in
the current action are the same or in privity with the parties in the prior action.”

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3
Skysign Int’l, 276 F.3d at 1115 (citing Santos v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 646 P.2d
962, 965-66 (Haw. 1982) (per curiam)). “‘[A]ll grounds of [a] claim . . . [that]
might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or
decided’” are precluded. Kauhane v. Acutron Co., 795 P.2d 276, 278 (Haw. 1990)
(quoting Morneau v. Stark Enters., Ltd., 539 P.2d 472, 474-75 (Haw. 1975))).
The requirements of res judicata are satisfied. See Skysign Int’l, 276 F.3d at
1115. Davis had the opportunity to litigate the claims asserted in his § 1983 action
before the Hawaii Circuit Court. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 91-14(b), (g); HOH Corp.
v. Motor Vehicle Indus. Licensing Bd., 736 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Haw. 1987). Because
Davis chose not to appeal the decision of the County of Maui’s Board of Water
Supply (the BWS), that decision became final and preclusive. See Misischia, 60
F.3d at 629; Kauhane, 795 P.2d at 278. The fairness requirements of Utah
Construction are met as well. See Misischia, 60 F.3d at 629. Therefore, the BWS
decision precludes Davis’s claims.
The district court correctly denied Davis leave to amend his complaint
because res judicata would bar relief even with his proposed amendments, and,
thus, amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., — F.3d —, No. 09-17364, 2011 WL 3911031, at *4 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2011)
(citation omitted).

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Because all of Davis’s claims are precluded, we affirm the district court’s
decision dismissing Davis’s § 1983 action with prejudice. We need not reach the
issue of whether Davis’s procedural due process claim is an impermissible
collateral attack, and we decline to do so.
AFFIRMED.

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