Gary R. Clark v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GARY R. CLARK,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 08-74172
Tax Ct. Nos. 19473-06L
8752-07L
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from a Decision of the
United States Tax Court
Submitted December 14, 2010**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Gary R. Clark appeals pro se from the Tax Court’s decision sustaining the
determination of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“Commissioner”) to
proceed with the collection of Clark’s income tax liabilities for 1998–2003. We
have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a). We review de novo the Tax Court’s
FILED
DEC 27 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C O U R T O F AP PE ALS

-- 1 of 2 --

08-74172 2
legal conclusions and for clear error its factual findings. Fargo v. Comm’r, 447
F.3d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.
Clark’s underlying tax liability is not properly at issue because, during the
agency proceedings, he did not contest receiving the deficiency notices. See 26
U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B) (allowing a taxpayer to challenge underlying tax liability
during a collection due process (“CDP”) hearing only if the taxpayer did not
receive statutory notice of the deficiency or did not otherwise have an opportunity
to dispute such liability). Accordingly, Clark’s related contentions concerning the
standard of review and the Commissioner’s duty to prove liability are foreclosed.
Contrary to Clark’s contention, the Commissioner did not improperly deny
him a face-to-face hearing based on his failure to identify relevant, nonfrivolous
issues for the hearing. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6330-1(d)(2)(A-D6) (2003) (“A CDP
hearing may, but is not required to, consist of a face-to-face meeting.”).
The Appeals officer who verified compliance under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 had
delegated authority to do so. See Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 536 (9th
Cir. 1992) (stating that the Secretary has properly delegated authority to local IRS
employees to carry out the tasks associated with tax collection and levy power).
Clark’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

-- 2 of 2 --