United States of America v. JUAN RODRIGUEZ, AKA Chief, AKA Clever

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JUAN RODRIGUEZ, AKA Chief, AKA
Clever,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 09-50495
D.C. No. 3:05-cr-00527-JAH-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 9, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: TROTT, WARDLAW, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Juan Rodriguez, who pleaded guilty to an extensive conspiracy to distribute
cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and 846, appeals his sentence of 30 years. His appeal has no merit.
FILED
DEC 15 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2
Given this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in receiving
hearsay evidence tending to show Rodriguez’s (1) connection to a street gang, and
(2) his relationship to the Mexican Mafia. Hearsay evidence is admissible at
sentencing “so long as it is accompanied by some minimal indicia of reliability.”
United States v. Littlesun, 444 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The hearsay evidence was corroborated by the letter stating that
“rent” was being paid to “Clever” (i.e. Rodriguez), the phone book found in the
cell of a known gang and mafia member that listed Rodriguez’s phone numbers
and address, and Rodriguez’s own admission that he associated with the Encinitas
Home Boys. In any event, it appears that this evidence was not a factor in the
district court’s determination of the length of his sentence, so any error would be
harmless. See United States v. Mendoza, 121 F.3d 510, 513-14 (9th Cir. 1997).
Second, Rodriguez complains he was denied the opportunity to voir dire two
witnesses who testified as part of an evidentiary hearing in connection with his
sentence. However, he does not explain how he was disadvantaged by the court’s
ruling, and he has not indicated what he would have accomplished during voir dire
that he could not accomplish on cross examination.
Third, Rodriguez’s sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively
erroneous. United States v. Carty, 530 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

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3
The district court followed the usual § 3553(a) factors and considered Rodriguez’s
mitigating evidence, including the comments of his family members and his claim
that he had a drug and gambling problem. Given the size and nature of
Rodriguez’s criminal organization, the determination of the length of his sentence
was appropriate and reasonable. The district court was well aware of the lesser
sentences meted out to his co-defendants, but because Rodriguez was the head of
his criminal conspiracy, the court’s choice of a harsher sentence for him was
rational and sensible. The goals of sentencing as articulated in § 3553(a)(2) are
well served by a lengthy sentence in this case.
AFFIRMED.

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