United States of America v. Shannon Michelle Clark

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHANNON MICHELLE CLARK,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 10-30105
D.C. No. 2:08-cr-00020-DWM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 16, 2010**
Before: TASHIMA, BERZON, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Shannon Michelle Clark appeals from her eight-month sentence imposed
following revocation of probation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
FILED
NOV 22 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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10-30105 2
Clark contends the district court failed to recognize that her alcohol abuse
was caused by stressors in her life, and imposed a substantively unreasonable
sentence. The record reflects that the district court did not procedurally err and
that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its
discretion because the sentence is substantively reasonable. See Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Peters, 470 F.3d 907, 909
(9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (stating that sentences imposed upon revocation of
probation are reviewed for reasonableness).
Clark also challenges the special condition of supervised release that
prohibits her from entering any establishment where alcohol is the primary item of
sale unless granted permission by the probation office for employment purposes
only. She argues that this condition is overbroad and unnecessarily interferes with
her ability to earn a living as a dancer at gentlemen’s clubs and bars. The record
indicates that this condition is narrowly tailored and is not a greater deprivation of
liberty than reasonably necessary to promote the goals of deterrence, protection of
the public, and rehabilitation. See United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1044
(9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, the district court did not plainly err. See United States
v. Vega, 545 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED.

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