Andres Barraza v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANDRES BARRAZA,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 05-76331
Agency No. A090-816-022
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 19, 2010**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TALLMAN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Andres Barraza, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen and
remand and dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying his
motion to reconsider her order denying his special motion to seek relief under
FILED
NOV 02 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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former section 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996). Our jurisdiction is
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a
motion to reconsider or reopen and review de novo claims of due process
violations. See Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002). We deny
in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
The agency acted within its discretion in denying Barraza’s motion to
reconsider because Barraza is not eligible to file a special motion to seek relief
under former section 212(c). See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44(k)(2) (individuals issued a
final order of deportation who then illegally return to the United States are
ineligible to file a special motion for relief under former section 212(c)); see also
Monet v. INS, 791 F.2d 752, 753 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Admission is not lawful if it is
regular only in form.”).
The BIA acted within its discretion in denying as untimely Barraza’s motion
to reopen and remand because the motion was filed more than ten years after his
removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Barraza did not show
that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Singh, 491
F.3d at 1096-97. Moreover, because Barraza failed to demonstrate a “gross
miscarriage of justice” in the prior proceeding, he may not at this point collaterally
attack his 1992 deportation order. See Hernandez-Almanza v. INS, 547 F.2d 100,

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102-03 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Avila-Sanchez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1037,
1040-41 (9th Cir. 2007) (construing the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen as a
“refus[al] to allow a collateral attack on the prior proceeding”).
We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua
sponte authority to reopen proceedings. See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159
(9th Cir. 2002).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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