Driawan Lukman v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DRIAWAN LUKMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 07-74179
Agency No. A095-634-616
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 23, 2010**
Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Driawan Lukman, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
FILED
AUG 31 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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(“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for
substantial evidence factual findings. Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1056
(9th Cir. 2009). We deny the petition for review.
The record does not compel the conclusion that Lukman established
extraordinary circumstances to excuse his untimely filed asylum application. See 8
C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5) (listing examples of extraordinary circumstances). We lack
jurisdiction to consider Lukman’s changed circumstances contention because he
did not exhaust it before the agency. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678
(9th Cir. 2004) (no subject-matter jurisdiction over legal claims not presented in
administrative proceedings below). Accordingly, we deny the petition as to
Lukman’s asylum claim.
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that the beatings Lukman
suffered as a teenager, the burning of his brother-in-law’s computer store during
the May 1998 riots, and the general harassment he endured, do not rise to the level
of persecution. See Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1059-60. Substantial evidence also
supports the IJ’s finding that, even as a member of a disfavored group, Lukman did
not establish a clear probability of future persecution because he did not show
sufficient individualized risk of persecution. See Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d
1179, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2003); Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1065 (“An applicant for

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withholding of removal will need to adduce a considerably larger quantum of
individualized-risk evidence to prevail”). Accordingly, we deny the petition as to
Lukman’s withholding of removal claim.
Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief
because Lukman failed to show it is more likely than not that he would be tortured
if removed to Indonesia. See Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1067-68.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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