Kimberly Young v. Regence Blueshield, a Washington non-profit corporation and JOHN DOES, 1 to 25

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Richard F. Cebull, United States District Judge for the**
District of Montana, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KIMBERLY YOUNG and CRAIG
YOUNG, wife and husband and the
marital community comprised thereof,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
REGENCE BLUESHIELD, a Washington
non-profit corporation and JOHN DOES, 1
to 25,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-36025
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-02008-RSL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert S. Lasnik, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 15, 2010
Seattle, Washington
Before: RYMER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and CEBULL, Chief District
Judge.**
FILED
JUL 27 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Requiring Regence to rewrite its Subscriber Agreements to state clearly1
that the subscriber would be billed for services for which benefits were exhausted
at the provider's non-contracted rates would be a pyrrhic victory that would not
provide the class “meaningful relief.” Cf. Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las
Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 879–80 (9th Cir. 2004). The language at issue in
this case is, in any event, no longer in the Agreements.
2
Kimberly and Craig Young appeal the district court’s dismissal of their
claims against Regence Blueshield under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(7), and Rule 19 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court acted within its discretion
in dismissing the case under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join a required party.
1.
A party is a required party to an action under Rule 19 if “the court cannot
accord complete relief among existing parties” in the absence of that party. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A). The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that the “Preferred Providers” were required parties because the Youngs sought to
require that the Preferred Providers (who would not be bound by a district court
decision in this case) bill them at the lower rate. Because this ground is alone1
sufficient to make the Preferred Providers required parties, we need not address
whether the Preferred Providers “claim[] an interest” in the lawsuit under Rule
19(a)(1)(B).

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3
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the required
parties (some 22,000 entities) could not feasibly be joined. See, e.g., Eldredge v.
Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training
Comm., 662 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing how joinder of 4500
employers proved impossible). Finally, the Youngs have an adequate alternative
remedy (administrative appeal) and the equities of the case do not preclude
dismissal.
2.
Prior to dismissing the case for failure to join required parties, the district
court dismissed the Youngs’ state law damage claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack
of standing. We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. McSherry v.
City of Long Beach, 584 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). Since the Rule 12(b)(7)
analysis above also applies to the state law damage claims, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal of these claims without reaching the question of standing.
AFFIRMED.

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